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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

FILE COPY

National Intelligence Council

SP - 80/84
12 April 1984
Copy 5

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence, USAF

FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs

SUBJECT: Request for Information

1. We have recently begun work on a [redacted] [redacted] In order to provide the best possible assessment of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of Soviet air defense, we need specific information from the Air Force about the threat systems those defenses must face. We have included a list of our needs as an attachment. 25X5

2. We would plan, with your concurrence, to make this information available to those elements of the CIA, Air Force, and Army that we have asked to prepare technical assessments for the NIE to assure that all assessments are based on the same threat parameters. Our objective is to use in this NIE the most realistic flight profiles for these aircraft and missiles. Where specific information cannot be provided (for example, due to lack of measurements or for security reasons), an approximation would be appreciated.

3. Our schedule for the completion of the NIE is dependent on beginning analysis with this information in the very near future. The NIE manager, [redacted], can be reached at [redacted] 25X1

Attachment

[redacted] USAF review completed.

SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: IN

SUBJECT: Request for Information

1 JUN 1984

V. 10/11/84
NIO/SP
NIO/GPF
NIO/WARNING
NIO/USSR/EE

NIO/ST

25X1



TO: National Intelligence Council
Director, Central Intelligence

1. Received your 3 May 1984 letter requesting specific information on US Air Force weapon systems.


2. The Air Force has staffed your request for data and reached the following conclusions:

a. While it is certainly within the purview of the Intelligence Community to perform capability and vulnerability analyses of Soviet systems, inclusion of specific US systems in a study of this nature is a task for net assessment.

b. The US system information is very sensitive, in some cases special access, and particularly scenario-dependent. We believe the data requested is not necessary to conduct a study of Soviet capabilities and vulnerabilities, and could possibly be used out of context in an analysis of the systems described.

c. The use of US system data would not include planning factors, operational realities, tactics, counter-measures, etc. and, therefore would prejudice the results.

3. We look forward to this capability and vulnerability analysis. The results will allow the Air Force to assess its current capabilities, revise tactics, and state future requirements to meet the evolving Soviet threat.


JAMES C. PFAUTZ, Maj Gen, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence